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Abstract 
 
The main objective of this contribution is to test whether university patents are an indicator of 
technology transfer potential at regional level. We build a university patent production function 
with 1519 patents for the 17 Spanish autonomous regions (NUTS-2) in a time span of 14 years 
(1988-2001). We use discrete choice econometric models to estimate their determinants. 
Among independent variables we include several indicators of proximity to other institutions’ 
technological competences. Our results suggest that the lower the proximity in technologies for 
production-intensive sectors, the more likely it will be that universities generate patents, 
whereas proximity in other technologies does not have a significant effect. We conclude that 
catching-up technological competencies of the region motivates university patenting in some 
technologies where the dichotomy between patentable and non-patentable research is stronger. 
For the rest of technologies, university patents are not necessarily a measure of regional 
technology transfer. 
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1. Introduction 
In newspapers, political programmes, university reports and industrial liaison offices’ 
leaflets, we usually observe a positive state of opinion regarding university patents1. 
Common wisdom identifies them as a fashionable way of showing research 
productivity, as well as mechanisms for signalling the market potential of universities 
and offering protected technology to firms that are  otherwise not interested in what 
universities produce. If actually only a few university patents are licensed, the usual 
questions are how firms may get access to public funds to reduce development costs 
after buying the patent, or how to enlarge the absolute number of patents issued, as if 
this increased the probability of commercial success. 
Some theoretical approaches to the relation between university science and industrial 
innovation provide some grounds to support these views. For Clark (1998: p. 7), 
“entrepreneurial universities learn faster than non-entrepreneurial counterparts that 
money from many sources enhances the opportunity to make significant moves without 
waiting for systemwide enactments that come slowly, with standardizing rules 
attached”. For supporters of the Triple Helix approach, the differences between basic 
and applied research are eventually blurring in growing fields of science with 
spontaneous industrial application, e.g. biotechnology or new materials. Therefore, it is 
natural that most productive faculty generate their traditional output, publications, but 
also patents (Etzkowitz, 1998). Besides, enhanced efforts by universities to be 
commercially relevant are a natural outcome of the changing role that society requires 
from them, more aimed at providing direct contributions to economic development 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). 
Other voices have been more critical. Feller (1990) foresaw an “erosion of the 
singular position of universities in US”, whose traditional independence of market 
incentives committed them to an efficient supply of scientific and technological 
knowledge. Moreover, he found “little reason to expect that a substantial reallocation of 
faculty effort will generate appreciable net revenues for other than a select number of 
universities”. The economics of science approach (Dasgupta and David, 1994) 
theoretically justified these views by pointing to the substitutive effects between R&D 
leading to patents, and other research which provides less tangible but wider benefits, 
including the nutrition of the former. Other studies have enumerated these indirect 
benefits in some detail (Salter and Martin, 2001, Scott et al., 2002). 
Special attention has been received by the critique of the reinforcement of industrial 
property rights, at least in the US case. Based on empirical evidence, it seems that the 
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 was not critical in enhancing an already existing trend (Mowery 
and Sampat, 2001). In fact, it favoured the appearance of less important patents from 
universities that were not previously active in patenting (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002). 
These conflicting views make university patents a relevant topic for policy making. 
Underlying them is the issue of what they are indicators for: R&D productivity? 
Technology transfer? Our main interest is to focus the debates in a regional context. The 
region is a crucial unit of observation for its capacity to implement science and 
technology policies and embed an idiosyncratic culture (Cooke, 1992). Hence, an 
                                                 
1 We will use this term to refer to patents applied for by universities. On patents with university inventors 
applied for by other institutions, see Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch (1998), Meyer (2004), Calderini et 
al. (2004) and Azagra et al. (2005). 
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immediate question is: Do we confirm the common empirical findings on university 
patents of studies at sub-regional level when we analyse the regional level, e.g. 
regarding their relation to R&D expenditure? 
Besides, the use of regions may provide useful insights into other issues. For instance, 
we may wonder whether it would make sense for regions to choose strategically among 
different university and joint research structures to increase the number of university 
patents. All in all, our target question is: Do regions have any scope to counterbalance 
possible negative effects of university patents? 
Moreover, the entrepreneurial university and the Triple Helix approaches defend also 
the active role universities tend to play in regional development. They do not argue a 
possible connection between university patents and university involvement in the 
region, and do not question whether they are compatible –implicitly it looks as if they 
are. In fact, there has been much literature trying to establish a link between proximity 
to a university and innovation by firms (e.g. Arundel and Geuna, 2000, Autant-Bernard 
et al., 2003). Therefore, we may wonder whether universities use patents as an 
instrument to strengthen their contact with the region. In other words: is regional 
catching-up a motivation for university patenting? 
The rest of this paper follows the traditional structure to find some answers. Section 2 
presents the literature review. Section 3 describes the methodology and the data used to 
expand our knowledge. Section 4 gives the results. Section 5 reaches some conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
We divide this section into the two main aspects to tackle: first, the relation between 
university patents and research productivity; second, the relation between university 
patents and technology transfer. 
2.1. University patents and research productivity 
2.1.1. What is their relation at sub-regional level? 
We found several studies that apply econometric techniques to estimate the relation 
between university patents and different explanatory variables. The first six (Foltz et al., 
2000; 2001; Carlsson and Fridh, 2002; Payne and Siow, 2003; Coupé, 2003; Baldini et 
al., 2004) use universities as a unit of observation, five in the US case and one in the 
Italian case. Two of them refer to the department or laboratory level of single European 
universities (Azagra et al., 2003, 2005). A final study uses individuals as the unit of 
observation, from two MIT departments (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002)2.  
All these studies start from a measure of university patenting with one common 
feature: this measure is the output of a production function with several determinants.  
The most frequent determinant included is R&D expenditure. Carlsson and Fridh 
(2002) use an aggregate measure of R&D expenditure. They find a significant positive 
                                                 
2 We should also mention other studies where the dependent variable is not patents but something related. 
Bercovitz and Feldman (2003) study individual faculty and the determinants of having filed a disclosure 
between 1997 and 1999. Markiewicz (2003) analyses technological classes and the determinants of the 
backward citation lags of university patents made by industrial patents.  
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impact on the number of disclosures, on which the number of patent applications 
depends. 
Regarding public funding, Payne and Siow (2003) find a positive impact of federal 
funding on patents, but the significance varies according to the specification. Overall, 
they conclude that the returns of university R&D to patents are decreasing, as in the 
case of firms. Coupé (2003) reaches a similar conclusion. Foltz et al. (2000) use the sum 
of federal and state funding and they find it positive and significant for all university 
patents but not significant for agricultural biotechnology university patents. Foltz et al. 
(2001) decompose the sum of both sources and they find that state funding has a 
positive, significant, influence on agricultural biotechnology university patents while 
federal funding has not. Azagra et al. (2003) find more costly, long-term-oriented, 
public funds significant, but not less costly, short-term-oriented ones. Azagra et al. 
(2005) find regional (not European or national) public funds significant. 
Hence, when we look at overall funding or its main component, public funding, it 
seems reasonable to propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the amount of university R&D funds, the more likely it is that 
universities will generate patents. 
A second usual determinant of university patents, or at least a variable to control the 
amount of R&D funds, is the size of the unit of observation. Payne and Siow (2003) 
measure it through the number of faculty and they do not find it significant. The same 
happens to Foltz et al. (2001). On the other hand, Coupé (2003) finds it significant. 
However, the same author uses a second measure, the number of alumni, which he does 
not find significant. Baldini et al. (2004) do not always find significant the effect of 
budget transfer from central government, taken as a proxy for size rather than for R&D 
resources. Azagra et al. (2003) do not find the number of faculty significant but Azagra 
et al. (2005) do. Overall, the evidence on size is not conclusive. We will state the 
following hypothesis with the expectation of a positive sign: 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the number of researchers, the more likely it is that 
universities will generate patents. 
Other determinants are external forces that grow as time goes by.3 A trend variable 
may capture them. Coupé (2003) and Baldini et al. (2004) find this trend positive and 
significant. Azagra et al. (2003) find it significant but Azagra et al. (2005) do not. The 
explanation may be in the national features of the following forces lying behind the 
trend: 
? Strength of technology transfer offices (TTO): Foltz et al. (2000) measure this 
through the number of employees of the TTO and they find that it matters positively 
and significantly (although with decreasing returns to scale. In turn, Foltz et al. 
(2001) find that this measure is not significant, while a measure of the quality of the 
                                                 
3 This is not to say that there are no more internal determinants of university patenting. Foltz et al (2001) 
and Coupé (2003) include a measure of faculty quality (average wage), which they find significantly 
positive. Foltz et al. (2001) include a measure of patenting experience (accumulated number of past 
patents) and they find it significantly positive. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) show a similar 
dependence on the number of past patents but not on the number of past papers, so the volume of both 
outputs does not seem complementary (however, they find some complementarities between patenting 
impact and publishing impact). On the contrary, Baldini et al. (2004) do not find evidence on 
dependence on past patenting by university, but positive evidence on dependence on past patenting by 
faculty members outside university. 
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TTO (the ratio between number of patent applications and  number of disclosures) is 
positive and significant. On the other hand, Coupé (2003) includes a dummy 
variable indicating the year of establishment of the TTO at the university, finding a 
positive and significant influence. The same happens to Carlsson and Fridh (2002) 
with the number of disclosures, on which the number of patent applications depends. 
They also find the influence of the number of TTO employees significant and 
positive. Azagra et al. (2003) find this too. 
? University R&D spillovers: Coupé (2003) includes a measure of aggregate R&D of 
other universities and he finds its impact positive and significant. He attributes it to 
knowledge externalities. Azagra et al. (2003) reach the same result. 
? Legal framework: Coupé (2003) uses a dummy variable to measure the legal change 
represented by the Bayh-Dole Act, without a significant effect. Something similar 
occurs to Azagra et al. (2003) with a dummy for an internal legal change that took 
place in their case study. However, Baldini et al. (2004) find that the adoption of an 
internal regulation is significant. 
Consequently, this is the hypothesis we want to test: 
Hypothesis 3. Over time, external forces make the number of university patents 
increase. 
2.1.2. Do regions have any scope to counterbalance possible negative effects of university 
patents? 
Not all universities in the same country are a homogeneous institution. One may 
distinguish among types of universities according to the historical period of their 
creation, since each period may foster different missions and organisational structures, 
e.g. medieval, contemporary and post-World War II universities (Geuna, 1999). One 
may think of different technical orientations (polytechnics and other) or regimes of 
ownership (public or private), etc. 
These differences may be relevant for the production of university patents, given that 
some universities may place greater emphasis on their generation. Some of the studies 
mentioned in the previous section have already tested this. Coupé (2003) makes a 
distinction between public and private universities but he does not find significant 
differences. Foltz et al. (2000) find that the presence of agricultural schools and the 
importance of agriculture in the local economy help to explain the production of 
agricultural biotechnology university patents. Baldini et al. (2004) do not find evidence 
that the presence of a medical school affects patenting. In addition, Mowery and Sampat 
(2001) show that, according to the prevailing incentives at a particular time, public or 
private universities will change their interest in patenting. 
Regions may contain different numbers and types of universities, because of their 
own historical trajectory and decision-making. This gives rise to several university 
structures among regions within the same country. It is plausible to expect that those 
structures where patenting-friendly universities predominate will show a higher number 
of university patents than others. This motivates the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. University structure matters: the composition of universities according to 
their age, technical orientation or regime of ownership will influence the generation of 
patents. 
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The existence of joint research centres in the region that give rise to combined work 
between universities and public research organisations (e.g. CNRS in France, CNR in 
Italy, CSIC in Spain) implies access to larger capital and human infrastructure in order 
to obtain newer and more important discoveries. Hence for universities, having joint 
research centres with public organisations may increase their resources. Besides, these 
organisations may have cultural and functional features that lead to higher protection by 
means of patents, e.g. their preference for research leading to practical applications as 
compared to universities (Cesaroni and Piccalugga, 2002) or the lack of teaching 
responsibilities. 
According to this reasoning, the presence of joint research centres would lead to more 
research results protected by patents. Actually, Azagra et al. (2003) show that the 
presence of a joint research centre at a university increases its propensity to patent. It 
would be interesting to provide further evidence of this kind, since there is a trend for 
universities in European countries to attract or create joint research units with their 
respective National Research Councils. 
For these reasons, we present the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. Joint research structure matters: the higher the number of joint research 
centres between universities and other public research organisations, the more likely it 
will be that universities generate patents. 
2.2. University patents and technology transfer: is regional catching-up a motivation 
for university patenting? 
A traditional argument to support university patents is their positive effects on 
technology transfer. Two grounds sustain this. First, protection of university inventions 
is a sign of their potential commercial value (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998). 
Second, if an invention has no protection, firms will not be interested in purchasing it, 
since competitors may use it as well (Schmiemann and Durvy, 2003). There are reasons 
to argue against these, e.g. interaction relies on informal trust-based relationships rather 
than on formalization through patents (Rappert et al., 1999), university patents replace 
what were formerly just public results, now subject to administrative procedures that 
may raise the cost of use (Mowery et al., 2001), or visibility provided by patenting is 
not enough to attract companies without additional efforts by TTO (Nelson, 2001). 
However, let us assume that they do not apply here. Our point is that, if patents enhance 
technology transfer, is this transfer made to institutions, e.g. firms, located within the 
region or outside the region? 
Let us analyse under what conditions the answer could be “to institutions within the 
region”. Assuming that universities would like to contribute to regional development 
through increased technology transfer, a necessary step would be for universities to 
adapt their fields of expertise to other institutions in the region's technological 
competences. If universities think that patenting will facilitate this process of 
adaptation, e.g. patenting in the same technological fields as other local institutions, 
reducing the distance between universities and other institutions will be an incentive for 
further patenting. In short, we may expect that catching–up with the technological 
competences of local institutions motivates national university patents. 
This argument leads us to present the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 6. The shorter the technological distance to other institutions, the more 
likely it will be that universities generate patents.  
3. Methodology and data 
The aim of the present section is to estimate some econometric models to find the 
determinants of university patents and test the hypotheses raised. 
The sample contains data about Spain, a member country of the European Union 
(EU). According to OECD (2002), Gross Expenditure on Research and Development 
(GERD) as a percentage of GDP grew from 0.41 in 1981 to 0.94 in 2001, the first year 
to reach 50% of the EU average. GERD performed by the Higher Education sector rose 
from 22.9% to 29.4% in the same period, around 4 times higher than the EU average in 
the last decade. However, Higher Education Expenditure on Research and Development 
(HERD) as a percentage of GDP, which augmented from 0.09 to 0.28, has only reached 
70% of the EU average in 2000. Hence, Spanish universities perform more R&D 
activities than Spanish firms do, but still little compared to EU universities. This is 
representative of peripheral countries of the EU as well as of economically developed 
countries with some technological weaknesses. Nevertheless, HERD financed by 
industry has increased from 1.2% in 1984 to 6.9% in 2000, fluctuating widely above the 
EU average from 1988, maybe due to statistical reasons (17% more in 2000). In any 
case, it seems that Spanish universities follow the general trend of increased industrial 
funding, common to most Western economies. 
We collected data for the 14 years from 1988 to 2001 in the case of patents, and 1987 
to 2000 in the case of the independent variables. We considered the 17 Spanish 
autonomous regions as units of observation. The resulting database is therefore a 238-
observation panel.4
3.1. Dependent variables and methods of estimation 
The dependent variables comprise Spanish university patents in the period 1988-
2001. At first, we include applications and grants, because both sorts of documents 
integrate the state of the art and can be a reference for future patents. Data come from 
the CIBEPAT database of the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office (OEPM). It 
contains patent documents and utility models applied for in Spain, as well as European 
and PCT patent documents designating Spain, since 1986, updated quarterly. We 
excluded utility models for this study. 
Our period of observation begins from 1988 because data for some independent 
variables start in 1987 and we assume, at least, a one year lag with them (see next sub-
section). It is a good starting date in that the European Patent Agreement came into 
force in Spain in 1986 and the PCT in 1989. The last year of the sample is 2001 because 
of the delay of updating. 
We made a query to identify all patents with at least one Spanish university among 
the applicants. As we may see in Table 1, we found 1,479 patents. We assigned patents 
                                                 
4 There have been some studies on university patents in Spain, not published in English. They tend to 
assume that university patents are positive and the main question is how to enhance their generation. 
(Fernández de Córdoba, 1996; Durán, 2003; Coronado et al., 2003).  
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to regions according to the main site of the university. When more than one university 
appeared in the list of applicants, we chose to assign one patent per university. This 
way, we counted 1,519 patents. Therefore, this method does not produce a high 
distortion in the data, only 2.7%. Another reading of this is that there is little 
collaboration between Spanish universities to get protection for technological 
discoveries. 
Table 1 also shows that most patent documents are national patents (94.5% of real 
and counted patents) while international patents represent a low percentage (5.5% of 
real and counted patents) of all the patents maybe because of their higher costs and 
requirements. 
In addition, while most national patents are grants (81.6%), most international patents 
are applications (75.9%) due to the delay of the granting process. 
Taking all this into consideration, we defined the next variables for the estimations: 
? Natpat: number of Spanish university counted patents applied for through the 
national route. 
? Natgrant: number of Spanish university counted patents granted through the 
national route. 
? Intpat: number of Spanish university counted patents applied for through an 
international route, i.e. the sum of both European and PCT patents. We considered it 
appropriate to add together these two sets of patents because of the small number of 
patents in each one. 
Table 1. Distribution of real and counted patents by route of patenting 
Real patents Counted patents 
 
Total Applied patents Granted Patents Total 
National patents 1398 264 1172 1436 
International patents 81 63 20 83 
European patents 10 7 3 10 
PCT patents 71 56 17 73 
TOTAL 1479 327 1192 1519 
Source: OEPM: Cibepat and own elaboration. 
In order to find the adequate estimation technique, we must take into account that 
patents are typical count data. Their characteristics are: integer, greater or equal to zero 
and of relatively small values. The baseline model is the Poisson regression model 
(PRM) (Hausman et al., 1984, Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, Greene, 2003). Assume that 
Y is a discrete random count variable such that yi = 0,1,2,3,… and the conditional 
probability of having yi patents follows the Poisson distribution with parameter λi: 
 
!
)|(
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y
it
ititit y
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ititλλ−==  (1) 
The PRM is defined as: 
  (2) [ ] TtniexyE itxititit ,...,1 ,,...,1 ,| ' ==== βλ
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, x is a vector of independent variables 
(the regressors), n=17 is the number of Spanish NUTS-2 regions and T=14 is the 
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number of years. Usually, under the validity of the model assumptions (Poisson data, 
i.i.d. observations) the method applied for parameter estimation for the PRM is 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
The Poisson distribution has only one parameter (λi), which is, due to the Poisson 
distribution’s property, both the mean and the variance. Thus, the PRM holds under the 
assumption of equidispersion. When Var[yi|xi] > E[yi|xi] we observe a feature called 
overdispersion. 
An extension of the PRM is the Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM)5. If 
there is evidence of overdispersion the standard variant of NBRM is as follows: 
Specify 
  (3) ititititit ux lnlnln
' +=+= λεβµ
and thus for µit >0 
 E[yit|xit] = µit (4) 
 [ ] 0  1 >+= ααµµ ),(| itititit xyV  (5) 
and hence, the variance exceeds the mean. 
This is the so-called NB2 model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998), due to the fact that its 
variance is quadratic in the mean, in contrast to the NB1 model which has a linear 
variance function specification with: Var[yi|xi] =  (1+α)µi. Clearly, both models reduce 
to the Poisson model case if the parameter α =0. The NBRM with quadratic variance 
function is found to be very useful in applied work and is estimated via maximum 
likelihood. 
Sometimes, one might be able to argue that different reasons cause the presence of 
zeros. The PRM and NBRM may not account satisfactorily for the excess zeros and so 
another model is needed. Zero-inflated count models respond to this failure of PRM and 
NBRM to account for the excess zeros in the data. Zero-inflated count models change 
the mean structure to allow two distinct processes for generating zeros. Vuong (1989) 
developed some general tests of non-nested models. Greene (1994) adapted one of these 
tests to the cases of ZIP vs. Poisson and zero-inflated negative binomial models vs. 
negative binomial models. 
Because of the small number of international patents, we followed an alternative 
approach by creating the following variable: 
? Intpat2: having at least one university counted patent, applied for through an 
international route. It is a transformation of intpat, leaving data with zeros as they 
were originally and transforming all the rest into ones. 
Following this alternative approach, a more appropriate technique of estimation for 
intpat2 is the Probit Model. The observable binary outcome, i.e. to patent (equal to 1) or 
not to patent (equal to 0), is represented by a variable Y that is related to the unobserved 
dependent (latent) variable Y* in the following way:  
 ,1=itY  if  0* >itY
 ,0=itY  if  (6) 0* ≤itY
  
                                                 
5 The NB distribution is given by the formula: f(yit|xit) = [Γ(yit+θ)*τ^yit*(1-τit)^θ]/Γ(yit+1)*Γ(θ), where 
θ=1/α, α ≥0 and τit=µit/(θ+µit), while yit = 0,1,2,...This reduces to the Poisson regression model if α=0. 
See also Cameron and Trivedi (1998), p. 71 
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Thus, the probit model represents the observed realization of a binary process with 
probabilities: 
 Pr[Yit = 1] = Pr[ ] = Pr[ > 0] = Φ( ) 0* >itY itit ux +β' β'itx
 Pr[Yit = 0] = Pr[ ] = Pr[ ≤ 0] = 1 - Φ( ) (7) 0* ≤itY itit ux +β' β'itx
Where Φ(.) is the cumulative probability function of the standard normal distribution, 
i.e. N(0,1).  
3.2. Independent variables and selection technique 
All the independent variables in the regression model are lagged one year in order to 
prevent endogeneity as much as possible. A first set of data comes from the National 
Statistics Institute (INE), specifically from R&D activities statistics. Regionalisation of 
these data started in 1987, which explains the beginning of our period of observation: 
? Lherd: logarithm of the real value of university R&D expenditure (in thousand 
Euro), using the GDP deflator. 
? Lfte: logarithm of the number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) researchers. 
We also introduce the following variable: 
? Trend: year of the patent application. 
Aspects concerning university structure come from the Universia.es portal6: 
? Univst1: a vector of three variables classifying universities according to their regime 
of ownership and being a polytechnic. Ppub is the proportion of public, non-
polytechnic universities, ppol the proportion of public, polytechnic universities and 
ppriv the proportion of private universities. We use ppub as the benchmark. 
? Univst2: a vector of four variables classifying universities according to epoch of 
creation, following Geuna (1999) and Rodríguez-San Pedro (2004): pmed is the 
proportion of medieval universities (up to 1475), pmod of modern universities (up to 
1800), pcont of contemporary universities (up to 1943) and prec of recent 
universities. Pmed is the benchmark. 
Since univst1 and univst2 overlap, we use them alternatively for the estimations. 
From the Spanish High Council for Scientific Research’s (CSIC) reports, we build 
the variables regarding other public research infrastructure: 
? Pjoi: ratio of number of university-CSIC joint research centres to number of 
universities. 
0 shows descriptive statistics of the independent variables described until now. The 
average R&D expenditure was 34.3 million euros per region and year while the average 
number of FTE-researchers was 1385. There were around three universities per region 
and year: more than 84% were public, around 12% were private and less than 4% were 
polytechnics. According to their time of creation, there were 3% medieval, 19% 
modern, 15% contemporary and 63% recent universities. Finally, for joint research 
centres there were more than one per region and year while their proportion was 
                                                 
6 This is a website created by thirty-two Spanish universities, the Spanish university chancellors 
committee and the Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), providing information and contents 
for the university community. http://www.universia.es. 
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approximately 37%, i.e. more than one third of universities had one joint research centre 
on average. 
Data related to the technological distance between universities and other institutions 
deserve a separate explanation. We obtained them through OEPM’s CIBEPAT database 
again. It contains a field that assigns patents to technological classes according to the 
eight sections of the International Patent Classification (IPC). We distributed university 
patents through this field, which may classify patents in more than one section. When 
this happens, we opted to assign one patent per section.7 Hence, the number of 
university patent sections may exceed the number of university patents. The distortion 
in the number of university patents is irrelevant, since we are trying to find a measure of 
closeness to other institutions’ technological competences. In order to do so, we made a 
second query in CIBEPAT to identify all patents applied for by Spanish residents other 
than universities and repeated the process to distribute them by IPC technological 
classes. Finally, we built the following vector of variables: 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of independent variables8. N=238. 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Herd 34341.6 39254 1.57601 4.45536 0 157684 
Fte 1385.13 1615.24 1.75914 5.48994 0 7802 
Ppub 0.845971 0.214805 -0.959798 2.39631 0.333333 1 
Ppol 0.0346885 0.0812606 2.41663 7.87373 0 0.333333 
Ppriv 0.119341 0.19732 1.31779 3.14932 0 0.666667 
Pmed 0.033691 0.106962 3.39215 13.6024 0 0.5 
Pmod 0.185578 0.333386 1.78634 4.67427 0 1 
Pcont 0.153797 0.255156 1.7164 5.37017 0 1 
Prec 0.626934 0.346687 -0.658058 2.24702 0 1 
Pjoi 0.367389 0.547863 1.95464 7.62337 0 3 
 
? TDi: absolute difference of the ratio of number of university patent sections in IPC 
section i to total university patents, minus the ratio of the number of other 
institutions’ patent sections in IPC section i to other institutions’ total patents, 
following this formula:  
 HAi
s
s
s
sTD H
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i
o
i
H
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u
i
u
i
i ,...,, =−= ∑∑
==
 (8) 
Where i is the IPC section, TD means technological distance and s the number of 
sections, u stands for university and o for other institutions. There are eight sections, so 
we can define eight technological distance variables, one per section.  
                                                 
7 Actually, the field specifies sub-sections within each section. We did not consider them, so if the field 
assigns more than one sub-section to one patent, we only count it once. 
8 Note that for the estimations we took non-proportion variables (herd, fte) in logs (lherd, lfte). 
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0 lists the IPC sections’ codes and names and shows the shares of universities’ and 
other institutions’ patent sections and their technological distances. Notice that we may 
build different measures of technological distance according to the subset of patents that 
we are studying. 
We observe from column three that the sections with the highest technological 
distance in national applied patents are C, B and G. The lowest technological distance 
corresponds to sections E, F, A, D, and H. The ranking is the same for national granted 
patents. For international patents, C and B are still at the top, but technological distance 
for C is much higher. However, G is no longer at the top but descends to the bottom. On 
the other hand, for international patents, while E, A and D are still at the bottom, F and, 
above all, H, rise positions in the ranking. The point is that Spanish universities are 
relatively producing many more international than national patents in section C, 
whereas the opposite occurs in sections G, F and H. 
From a conceptual point of view, it is important to notice that we can roughly link 
IPC sections to Pavitt’s (1984) sectoral taxonomy. While sections A, D and E are more 
likely to be applied in supplier dominated sectors, sections B and F are more likely to be 
applied in production intensive sectors and sections C, G and H in science-based 
sectors. 
Table 3. Technological distance of universities and other institutions by IPC section 
IPC code IPC name National applied patents 
National granted 
patents 
International 
applied patents 
A Human Necessities 3.63% 3.67% 2.09% 
B Performing Operations; Transporting 13.96% 14.10% 10.56% 
C Chemistry; Metallurgy 20.71% 20.22% 31.16% 
D Textiles; Paper 1.38% 1.44% 1.93% 
E Fixed Constructions 7.70% 7.59% 6.59% 
F Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; Heating; Weapons; Blasting 6.37% 6.25% 8.60% 
G Physics 12.40% 12.86% 1.74% 
H Electricity 0.06% 0.02% 7.30% 
Source: www.wipo.int/classifications/en and own elaboration. 
When we run the regressions, in order to choose among different count data models 
and reduce the number of variables, we will follow this selection strategy: We start by 
estimating a Poisson regression. If the Cameron-Trivedi test does not indicate 
overdispersion, but the Vuong statistic indicates excess of zeros, we estimate a zero 
inflated Poisson regression. If the Cameron-Trivedi test indicates overdispersion, we 
estimate a negative binomial regression. We make a likelihood ratio test against Poisson 
regression. If we prefer negative binomial regression and the Vuong statistic indicates 
excess of zeros, we estimate a zero inflated negative binomial regression. Once the best 
technique has been selected, we delete the non-significant variable the coefficient of 
which has the worst t-value. We estimate a reduced model without the deleted variable. 
We make a likelihood ratio test against the original model. If the test shows preference 
for the reduced model, we repeat the previous steps. If there are no non-significant 
variables to delete, we accept the reduced model9. 
                                                 
9 In a similar fashion we carried out the model selection procedure for the probit model. 
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4. Results 
We show the final reduced models directly. Notice for count data models that 
negative binomial estimations were always preferred to Poisson and zero inflated 
negative binomial ones. The following assertions derive from Table 4. 
Table 4. Discrete choice estimation of Spanish university patent production functions 
 Negative Binomial 
Regression 
Negative Binomial 
Regression 
Negative Binomial 
Regression 
Binomial Probit 
Model 
Dependent variable  Natpat Natgrant Intpat Intpat2 
Number of 
observations 
238 238 238 238 
Log likelihood 
function  
-515.47 -503.55 -137.62 -85.89 
Prob[χ2 > value] =  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Constant -144.78 (-6.74) -8.01 (-10.39) -14.75 (-7.33) -7.98 (-6.55) 
Lherd 2.15 (20.9) 2.2 (13.97) 2.98 (6.99) 1.59 (5.95) 
Trend 0.07 (6.36)    
TDB -1.23 (-3.39) -1.12 (-2.09)   
TDF -1.67 (-3.2) -1.83 (-2.35)   
α 0.08 (4.3) 0.53 (6.03) 1.5 (2.71)  
T-ratios in parenthesis. The construction of variable TDi varies according to the subset of patents. 
There is empirical evidence that Hypothesis 1 is valid, since the variable of R&D 
expenditure indicates a significant positive relation with the number of university 
patents produced in all estimations. Actually, it is the only significant determinant of 
international university patents. Notice that the R&D variable is in logarithmic form. 
Thus, the regression coefficients are elasticities. According to this interpretation, a one 
percent increase in R&D funds will increase the number of patents issued by 
universities more than 2% and the number of international patents by 3%. 
It is important is to find out whether this 3% is statistically higher than the 2% value 
that we have found for national patents. We want to compare the means of two normal 
distributions (for the normality of the estimated parameters as a result of maximum 
likelihood estimation, see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998: p. 62). We find that for variables 
X~N(µ,σ2) and Y~N(ν,τ2), then Z=X-Y~ N(µ-ν,σ2+τ2), where we have defined: X= 
estimated coefficient of lherdintpat~N[2.98, (0.426)2] and Y= estimated coefficient of 
lherdnatpat~N[2.169,(0.105)2]. Thus Z~N(0.81,0.19). For H0: µ-ν=0, we derive 
χ2(1)90%=2.71<Wtest=3.453<3.84=χ2(1)95%, via a Wald test. That is, at 5% significance 
level we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of lherdintpat and 
lherdnatpat are statistically equal, while at 10% we can. In short, there is some evidence 
that the coefficient of R&D expenditure for international patents is higher than for 
national ones, but it is weak. 
In any case, this is a higher ratio than in previous results by Payne and Siow (2003) 
and Coupé (2003), where the increase of patents was not higher than 1%. The 
explanation may lie in the fact that they use only public funding rather than all funding. 
However, Azagra et al. (2003, 2005) also use all funding but find lower elasticity for 
R&D funds. A second explanation may be, then, the unit of observation. Adams and 
Griliches (2000) find that while measuring research performance of US universities, the 
research output variable follows diminishing returns to scale at the individual level. 
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However, at the aggregate level there is evidence of constant returns. In a similar 
fashion, we believe that the fact of having an elasticity higher than one in the R&D 
expenditure variable differs from the relevant literature because we treat our sample 
data at a higher level of aggregation. 
The data do not confirm Hypothesis 2, so the number of university researchers does 
not seem to influence the number of patents issued in Spain. 
The data give evidence to support Hypothesis 3 only in the case of natpat. We find 
the time trend significant, as in Azagra et al. (2003, 2005) and Coupé (2003), meaning 
that there are exogenous factors not included in the present model, which produce only 
more national applications, i.e. probably lower quality patents. Henderson et al. (1998) 
and Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) find somewhat similar results in the US case, 
regarding the declining quality of university patents. 
The data do not support Hypothesis 4, i.e. university structure does not influence the 
production of national university patents.10
Again, the data do not support Hypothesis 5 –the production of university patents is 
not influenced by joint research structure, expressed as the ratio of the number of joint 
research centres to the number of universities.11
Regarding Hypothesis 6, for natpat and natgrant we also find that TDB and TDF are 
significant with negative sign. Let us recall from the comments on 0 that Sections B and 
F are more likely to be applied in production intensive sectors. Hence, if catching-up 
with regional competences is a motivation behind university patenting, it is particularly 
so in these technologies. However, this may be the case only for national university 
patents. For international ones, under both specifications of the variable (intpat and 
intpat2), TDB and TDF do not appear significant and have to be kept out of the model. In 
any case, reducing technological distance in technologies for supplier dominated and 
science-based sectors has no significant effect on university patents, neither national nor 
international.12  
5. Conclusions 
Three main interests guided this research: Do we confirm the relation between 
university patents and research productivity at regional level? If so, do regions have any 
scope to counterbalance possible negative effects of university patents? In addition, is 
regional catching-up a motivation for university patenting? 
According to our results, university patents are an indicator of R&D efforts also when 
we focus on the region, but  they are not an indicator of how regions organize their 
university or joint research structure. Therefore, if there is a re-composition of academic 
R&D favouring patentable results and if regions cannot control their academic structure 
to compensate for it, e.g. by favouring the predominance of institutions less prone to 
select this kind of R&D, the fear of unintended consequences could be justified. 
                                                 
10 We tried to combine both specifications, change the benchmark and even created another variable 
which was the average age of universities in the region. No alternative modified the result. 
11 We tried to discount joint centres in social sciences and humanities from our measure. It did not change 
the results. 
12 Since technologies in sections B and F may have in common the likelihood of being applied in 
production intensive sectors (see 0 and its comments), we wondered whether we find this econometric 
effect because patents classified in section B are also classified in F. Actually, our analysis shows that 
this is rarely the case. 
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It might even be reinforced, because if catching-up with the technological 
competences of the region motivates university patenting, this is especially so in 
technologies likely to be applied in production intensive sectors. Here the dichotomy 
between patentable and non-patentable research is stronger than in science-based 
technologies and catching-up will probably mean devoting more resources to patentable 
research13. And naturally, catching-up with other institutions in the region is not an 
important motivation for applying through international procedures in these 
technologies. 
Let us recall that neither set of patents is an indicator of technological catching-up 
with the region in science-based technologies (chemistry, physics, electricity and 
electronics). Hence, if university patents are a measure of technology transfer potential, 
this does not necessarily mean regional technology transfer in science-based 
technologies. In countries like Spain, specialised in traditional sectors and not in high-
tech industries, i.e. in economic activities with lower reliance on science-based 
technologies, our finding may mean that (at least national) university patents are a 
mechanism of consolidation rather than of diversification of the existing industrial 
structure. 
Future research should start by improving data for our independent variables. We aim 
to decompose R&D funds by type of R&D (basic research, applied research, 
technological development) and source of R&D (public administration, firms, other 
institutions). We are also trying to disentangle what is behind the trend, especially to 
gather data on the strength of TTO. We can justify that these and the rest of the 
independent variables may determine the process of publication production, and this 
way explore the complementarity with patent production. Besides, in the process of 
studying the latter, we have constructed variables for university and joint research 
structure, and for technological distance between universities and other institutions. The 
explanation of both deserves further analysis. 
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